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Jeffrey Haylock*

The National Class as Extraterritorial
Legislation

This article argues that provincially constituted multijurisdictional class actions
violate the constitutional law of extraterritoriality. It begins with a brief overview of
the law of adjudicative jurisdiction, then provides a longer overview of the separate
body of law that imposes extraterritorial limits on substantive provincial legislation.
The author then demonstrates the substantive characterof class action legislation,
which necessarily entails the applicability of the law of extraterritoriality However,
much of the relevant jurisprudence, as well as some of the relevant academic
literature, has ignored this important issue. Application of the lawof extraterritoriality
does, indeed, raise serious constitutional concerns, as the article's central section
demonstrates. The desirable efficiencies of national classes may, however, be
largely preserved through the use of co-ordinated parallel provincial classes.
These have already worked in practice, and the flexibility of existing class action
legislation can easily accommodate them.
Cet article allegue que les recours collectifs entrepris dans une province et mettant
en cause des parties dans d'autres ressorts violent le principe de Iextraterritorialit6
du droit constitutionnel. II donne d'abord un bref apergu du droit applicable aux
instances d~cisionnelles puis explique plus Ionguement les regles juridiques
distinctes qui imposent des limites extraterritoriales au droit substantif provincial.
L'auteurd~montre ensuite le caractere substantif des lois sur les recours collectifs,
lesquelles touchent n6cessairement I'applicabilitedu principe d'extraterritoriait6.
Cependant, une grande partie de la jurisprudence et la doctrine ont neglig6 ce
point important. L'application du principe d'extraterritorialit6 soul~ve en effet de
profondes pr6occupations constitutionnelles, ainsi que le d6montre la partie
centrale de Particle. Les efficiences souhaitables des recours collectifs nationaux
pourraient toutefois 6tre preserv~es dans une large mesure grace j I'utilisation
de poursuites provinciales paralleles coordonn~es. De telles recours ont d6ja fait
leurs preuves dans la pratique et la souplesse des lois existantes en mati~re de
recours collectif permet une adaptation facile.
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Introduction
La Forest J. wrote that the subject matter in Hunt v. T&Nplc lay "at the
confluence of private international law and constitutional law."' The
same could be said of this article. Soon after the common law provinces
began to pass class action legislation, multijurisdictional classes emerged.
Predictably, a sizeable body of Canadian scholarship on the subject

1.

Hunt v. T&N, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, at para. 1.
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followed.2 Much of this scholarship discusses the constitutionality of
national classes from the perspective of court jurisdiction; so do the cases.
For many, the issue seems to have been put on the back burner. In Canada
Post Corp. v. L~pine, LeBel J. implicitly accepted the constitutionality of
national classes by writing that "the need to for... . national classes does

seem to arise occasionally," 3 while in Bondy v. Toshiba of Canada Ltd.,
Brockenshire J. recently wrote that "national class actions are now very
much an unremarkable part of class proceedings litigation."4 However,
other voices, most notably the Quebec Court of Appeal in Hocking c.
Haziza,5 have recently resurrected the constitutionality of national classes
as a live issue. This article aims to add to recent discussion of this topic,
by suggesting deficiencies in the analyses that established national classes'
constitutional security.
After a broad overview of the relevant law, this article will show
how the case law and the. surrounding scholarship have largely limited

2.
Chris Dafoe, "A Path Through the Class Action Chaos: Selecting the Most Appropriate
Jurisdiction with a National Class Action Panel" (2006) 3 Can. Class Action Rev. 541; Uniform
Law Conference of Canada, Report of the Uniform Law Conference of Canadas Committee on the
National Class and Related Interjurisdictional Issues: Background, Analysis and Recommendations
(Vancouver, 2005); Janet Walker, "Coordinating Multijurisdiction Class Actions Through Existing
Certification Processes" (2005) 42 Can. Bus. L. J. 112; Janet Walker, "Recognizing Multijurisdiction
Class Action Judgments within Canada: Key Questions-Suggested Answers" (2008) 46 Can. Bus. L.
J. 450; Jamie Cassels & Craig Jones, The Law ofLarge-ScaleClaims: ProductLiability, Mass Torts and
Complex Litigation in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) c. 4; Ward Branch & Christopher Rhone,
"Chaos or Consistency? The National Class Action Dilemma" (2002) available online: <http://www.
branchmacmaster.com/storage/artices/chaos consistency.pdf >; Craig Jones, Theory of Class Actions
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) c. 8-9; Craig Jones, "The Case for the National Class" (2004) 1 Can.
Class Action Rev. 29; Craig Jones & Angela Baxter, "Fumbling Toward Efficacy: Interjudisdictional
Class Actions after Currie v. McDonald's" (2006) 3 Can. Class Action Rev. 405; Stuart Kugler &
Robert Kugler, "Quebec: The Class Action Haven" (2004) 1 Can. Class Action Rev. 155; Stephen
Lamont, "The Problem of the National Class: Extra-territorial Class Definitions and the Jurisdiction
of the Court" (2001) 24 Advocates' Q. 252; Tanya Monestier, "Lipine v. CanadaPost: Ironing out the
Wrinkles in the Inter-Provincial Enforcement of Class Judgments" (2008) 34 Advocates' Q. 499; F.
Paul Morrison, Eric Gertner & Hovsep Afarian, "The Rise and Possible Demise of the National Class
in Canada" (2004) 1 Can. Class Action Rev. 67; Celeste Poltak, "Ontario and Her Sisters: Should
Full Faith and Credit Apply to the National Class?" (2006) 3 Can. Class Action Rev. 437; Colin K.
Irving & Mathieu Bouchard, "National Opt Out Class Actions, A Constitutional Assessment" (paper
presented to the Fourth Annual Conference on Class Actions of the Canadian Bar Association, Quebec
Branch, April 23, 2009), (2009) 26 N.J.C.L. 11. As this article went to press I became aware of two
recent articles, Peter W. Hogg & Ann S. Gordon McKee, "Are National Class Actions Constitutional?"
(2010) 26 N.J.C.L. 279, which reaches conclusions similar to those found here, and Tanya J. Monestier,
"Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Class Members: Have We Gone Down the Wrong Road?"
(2010) 45 Tex. Int. L. J. 537, which deals mainly with the issue of adjudicative jurisdiction, but does
touch briefly on the issue of legislative jurisdiction. Because both articles appeared very recently,
neither will be considered in what follows.
3.
Canada Post Corp. v. L~pine, 2009 SCC 16, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 549 [L~pine] at para. 56.
4.
Bondy v. Toshiba of CanadaLtd., [2007] O.J. No. 784 (QL) (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at para. 28.
5.
Hocking c. Haziza, 2008 QCCA 800, [2008] R.J.Q. 1189 [Hocking].
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their treatment of the constitutional implications of the national class to
discussion of the constitutional limits on jurisdiction that have emerged
from Morguard v. De Savoye6 and Hunt v. T&N plc.7 This narrow focus
has missed something important. It has ignored the important implications
of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on extraterritoriality.' An
application of this law to class actions' preclusive effects on claims
will raise serious questions about provinces' ability to create national
classes, at least on an opt-out basis. It is an unsatisfying result, but one
that is unavoidable. The article will conclude by suggesting a partial-if
imperfect-way forward.
I. A Morguard refresher
Whether in the law journals or in the courts, almost every Canadian
analysis of the interaction between national classes and the constitution
has focused on Morguard. The main point of this article is that this
has been a mistake-that an undue focus on the constitutional issue of
adjudicative jurisdiction has obscured the equally relevant constitutional
issue of extraterritoriality. However, because of Morguard'scentral place
in Canadian thinking on national classes, almost everything that follows
in this article necessarily presupposes familiarity with that case, and its
constitutionalization in Hunt.9
Morguardwasa case about the recognition of interprovincialjudgments.
In it, La Forest J. revolutionized the field, considerably expanding the
old common law test.'" He determined that within a federal state such
as Canada, courts should extend "full faith and credit" to the judgments
of their extra-provincial counterparts, provided that the action enjoyed a

6.
Morguardv. De Savoye, [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [Morguard].
7.
Hunt, supranote 1.
8.
Principally Unifund Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, 2003. SCC 40,
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 63 [Unifund]; British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 [Imperial Tobacco]; and Castillov. Castillo, 2005 SCC 83, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 870
[Castillo].
9. Hunt, supra note I.
10. Before Morguard,the basic rule, shorn of its nuances, was that the court of one province would
recognize the judgments or orders of a court in another if the defendant in that latter court had been
served within its territorial jurisdiction, or had attomed to its jurisdiction by participating in the
proceedings. See, for example, Emanuel v. Symon, [1908] I K.B. 302 (C.A.).
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"substantial connection with thejurisdiction where the action took place.""
Consideration of the appropriate circumstances of enforcement also led
La Forest J. to consider the circumstances underwhich a court could
exercise jurisdiction in the first place. In his opinion, the two questions
had the same answer, and original and enforcement jurisdiction should be
seen as co-extensive: "It seems to me that the approach of permitting suit
where there is a real and substantial connection with the action provides a
reasonable balance between the rights of the parties."' 2
In Morguard, La Forest J. alluded to the possibility of jurisdiction
and enforcement as constitutional matters, but he declined to decide on
the matter definitively. 3 In Hunt, he took the matter head on. In declaring
a Qudbec statue inapplicable because it purported to block discovery in
a British Columbia case and thus to prevent enforcement of a British
Columbia order, La Forest J. confirmed that the principles enunciated
in Morguardwere, indeed, principles of the Canadian constitution. The
requirements of enforcement were "constitutional imperatives."'1 4 The
Quebec statute was therefore constitutionally inapplicable to the orders
of other provinces. With regard to adjudicative jurisdiction, La Forest J.
wrote that "courts are required, by constitutional constraints, to assume
jurisdiction only where there are real and substantial connections to that.
place."' 5
II. The law of extraterritoriality
This article is in large part concerned with the boundaries that limit the
scope of provincial legislation. The subject matter that falls under the
provinces' purview is to be found, of course, in s. 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867,16 which is subject to the general geographical limit of"In each
Province." Because I am concerned with class actions' preclusive effect
on absent class members' civil rights, the provision of real interest here is

11. Morguard,supra note 6 at para. 52. Although it lies outside the scope of this article, it should
be noted that the recent judgments in Hocking, supra note 5; and Ldpine, supra note 3 indicate that
in the context of class actions, Canadian courts (or, at least courts applying the Civil Code of Quebec,
S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Articles 3155 and 3164) may be open to considering issues of procedural fairness
even within Confederation. For an example of a Canadian court refusing enforcement in Ontario of
an American class action settlement for reasons of adequate notification (which the Court imports into
the test for adjudicative jurisdiction simpliciter)see Currie v.McDonalds Restaurants of CanadaLtd.,
[2005] 74 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.).
12. Morguard, ibid.at para. 51. The phrase "real and substantial connection" was borrowed from the
House of Lords'judgment in Indyka v. Indyka, [1969] 1A.C. 333 (H.L.).
13. Morguard, ibid. at paras. 39 and 52.
14. Hunt, supra note I at para. 56.
15. Ibid. at para. 63.
16. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1885, App I1,No. 5.

258

The Dalhousie Law Journal

s. 92(13). Along with s. 92's general introduction to the provincial heads,
this subsection reads as follows:
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in
relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein
after enumerated; that is to say,(13) Property and Civil Rights in the Province.' 7
The section betrays an emphatic concern to limit the territorial reach of
legislation-a concern that characterized nineteenth-century theories
of legislative power. Austen Parrish writes that before the rise of
American legal realism in the early twentieth century, the field of private
international law was dominated by the theory that all rights vested in a
particular jurisdiction. The discovery of where rights were vested was
choice of law's primary goal. The theory of territorial vesting also had
consequences for the scope of legislative authority: as a concomitant of its
sovereignty, a legislature had the sole authority to create, alter or annihilate
rights located within its territorial purview. 8 Section 92 of our constitution
might fairly be thought of as a constitutionalization of these modes of
thought: in the field of provincial competency, nineteenth-century thinking
has been the starting point for Canadian jurisprudence 9 and has remained
the touchstone.
In Churchill Falls,20 McIntyre J. analyzed the constitutionality of a
Newfoundland statute 2' that terminated a contract between Hydro-Quebec

and a federal corporation that had developed hydro resources at Churchill
Falls, Labrador, granting the former the right to almost all of the electricity
generated at the site. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal had found the
Act to be intra vires the province,2 2 but the Supreme Court overturned
that ruling on the grounds of extraterritoriality. McIntyre J.'s analysis
of the issue took the traditional form of a "pith and substance" analysis.
Formulated to take into account extraterritorial concerns, this requires that
a court determine the enactment's central subject matter, as well as the
location of that subject matter. It will be noted that this analysis depends on
17. Ibid., s. 92(13).
18. Austen L. Parrish, "The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business" (2008) 61 Vand. L.
Rev. 1455 at 1463-1467.
19. See, for example, Royal Bank of Canada v. The King, [1913] A.C. 283 (P.C.); Ottawa Valley
Power Co. v. Hydro-ElectricPower Commission, [1937] O.R. 265 (C.A.); Ladore v. Bennett, [1939]
A.C. 468 (P.C.).
20. Reference Re: Upper Churchill Rights Reversion Act 1980, [1984] I S.C.R. 297 [Churchill
Falls].
21. The Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, S.N. 1980, c. 40.
22. (1982), 134 D.L.R. (3d) 288 (Nfld. C.A.).
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the notion that all subject matters-including intangible civil rights-have
roots in a particular jurisdiction. Incidental effects on extra-provincial
rights are permissible, but where in pith and substance legislation affects
such rights, it is ultra vires the enacting province.2 3 The analysis in this
particular case referred to the pith and substance of an entire statute,
but McIntyre J. implied elsewhere that particular sections might also be
severed from otherwise valid legislation by reason of their being aimed at
extraterritorial subject-matter. 24
In applying the test, McIntyre J. found that the'act in pith and
substance derogated from Hydro-Qudbec's contractual rights, which it
fell to him to locate. In order to do this, he applied traditional choice of
law rules: because the contract provided that the Quebec courts were to
have jurisdiction over any disputes arising under the contract, the rights'
location was Quebec. The Newfoundland legislature could not legislate
with respect to them, and the act was ultra vires.25
Decided several years after Morguard,6 Unifund briefly left some
uncertainty about the status of ChurchillFalls'pith and substance approach
to extraterritoriality. In Unifund, the respondent was an Ontario insurer of
faultless Ontarian victims of an automobile accident that had occurred in
British Columbia. The respondent sought contribution from the British
Columbia insurer of a British Columbian driver who was at fault in having
caused the accident. The Ontario legislation would have allowed such
contribution2 7; British Columbia legislation would not have. The question
was whether the Ontario statute was applicable to this situation.
Writing for the majority,28 Binnie J. began his analysis by referring to
Morguard,which he acknowledged to be a case not about extraterritorial
applicability, but about adjudicative jurisdiction. Morguard's principles,
however, could still inform an applicability analysis. He wrote,
Consideration of constitutional applicability can conveniently be
organized around the following propositions:
1. The territorial limits on the scope of provincial legislative authority
prevent the application of the law of a province to matters not
sufficiently connected to it;
23. Churchill Falls, supra note 20 at 332.
24. Ibid. at 315.
25. Ibid. at 334.
26. Morguard, supra note 6.
27. Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 1.8.
28. In a dissenting judgment, Bastarache J. applied the pith and substance analysis of Churchill
Falls, supra note 20, and found the Ontario legislation to be constitutionally applicable, reasoning that
it affected extraprovincial rights only incidentally.
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2. What constitutes a "sufficient" connection depends on the
relationship among the enacting jurisdiction, the subject matter of
the legislation and the individual or entity sought to be regulated by
it;

3. The applicability of an otherwise competent provincial legislation
to out-of-province defendants is conditioned by the requirements of
order and fairness that underlie our federal arrangements;
4.

The principles of order and fairness, being purposive, are applied
flexibly according to the subject matter of the legislation.29

After setting out these considerations, Binnie J. made clear that the
connection needed to support legislative jurisdiction was stronger than
that needed under Morgard to support adjudicative jurisdiction. Such are
the requirements of territorial sovereignty.30
As Edinger and Black point out,3' Binnie J. then continued by
reinterpreting numerous Canadian extraterritoriality cases as instantiations
of the "sufficient connection" principle.3 2 In locating specific rights, past
cases seemed, really, to be determining the jurisdiction to which those
rights had the closest connection. Edinger and Black further point out that
"[t]he majority appears to believe that it is possible to use Morguardto
create watertight territorial compartments to which entities are allocated
and by whose regulatory regimes all activities will be regulated."33 This
suggests that the majority had in mind a kind of strong Morguardtest: a
statute is constitutionally applicable if its enacting province enjoys the
most real and substantial connection to the matter in issue.
The extent to which Unifund's Morguard-inspiredapproach would
penetrate into the law of constitutional extraterritoriality was uncertain for
several years following.3 4 In 2005, Imperial Tobacco35 confirmed that the
pith and substance approach would remain the standard mode of analysis
in determining the validity of statutes impugned for extraterritorial effect.
This approach, however, would benefit from Unifund's insights.
29. Unifund, supra note 8 at para. 56.
30. Ibid. at para. 58.
31. Elizabeth Edinger & Vaughan Black, "A New Approach to Extraterritoriality: UnifundAssurance
Co. v. I.C.B.C." (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L. J. 161 at 178.
32. Unifund,supra note 8 at paras. 63-66.
33. Edinger & Black, supra note 31 at 182-183.
34. Edinger & Black, ibid. at 163 write that "Unifund's implications are anything but clear. It may
turn out to be a relatively unimportant decision with little impact outside the field of interprovincial
automobile insurance law. Or it could come to stand as a significant turning point, especially in the
law pertaining to judicial scrutiny of the territorial limits on provincial regulatory statutes."
35. Imperial Tobacco, supranote 8.
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The case concerned a British Columbia statute that granted the
provincial Crown a right of action against tobacco companies for recovery
of tobacco-related health care costs. 36 The tobacco companies were liable
only for activities that constituted breaches of duties owed to people in
British Columbia.37 One of the three questions before the court was whether
the statute was ultra vires the British Columbia legislature by reason of
extraterritoriality. 8 Writing for a unanimous court, Major J. answered in
the negative. To begin his analysis, he set out the standard ChurchillFalls
pith and substance test, which looks first to the legislation's "essential
character or dominant feature."3 9 Itis once this pith and substance has
been determined that Unifund enters the picture. Major J. cast a view to
ChurchillFalls through Unifund spectacles:
In ChurchillFalls, an examination of those relationships [viz., among the
enacting territory, the subject matter of the law and the persons subject to
the law's regulation] indicated that the intangible civil rights constituting
the pith and substance of the Newfoundland legislation at issue were not
meaningfully connected to the legislating province, and could properly
be the subject matter only of Quebec legislation.4"
This statement reinforces the proposal above that Unifund was
articulating a kind of strong Morguardtest, perhaps akin to the "closest
and most real connection test" that the common law employs in deciding
choice of law in contract.4 ' This test will ensure the fulfilment of s.
92's dual purpose, "namely, to ensure that provincial legislation has
a meaningful connection to the enacting province and pays respect to
the legislative sovereignty of other territories. 4 a2 Major J. then went on
to apply these principles to the impugned legislation, finding that "no
territory could possibly assert a stronger' relationship to that cause of
action than British Columbia. 4 a3 Churchill Falls' notion that intangible
rights do have locations was thus retained, but the analysis for ascertaining

36. Tobacco Damagesand Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2000, c. 30.
37. Imperial Tobacco, supra note 8 at para. 10.
38. Ibid. at para. 25. The other two questions, which do not concern this article, were whether the act
unconstitutionally interfered with judicial independence, and whether it unconstitutionally offended
the rule of law.
39. Ibid. at para. 29.
40. Ibid. at para. 35.
41. For varying expressions of this test, see, inter alia,Etler v. Kertesz, [1960] O.R. 672 (C.A.); The
Assunzione, [1954] All E.R. 278 (C.A.), and Amin RasheedShipping Corporationv. Kuwait Insurance
Co., [1984] 1A.C. 50 (H.L.).
42. Imperial Tobacco, supra note 8 at para. 36.
43. Ibid. at para. 38.
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these locations was transformed from one rooted in choice of law into one
rooted in connections."
Bastarache J.'s concurring minority judgment in Castillo further
clarified how the Imperial Tobacco "meaningful connection" test for
legislative scope works in practice, and what it applies to. Castillo dealt
with the constitutionality of an Alberta statute, s. .12 of which read as
follows:
12. The limitations law of the Province shall be applied whenever
a remedial order is sought in this Province, notwithstanding that, in
accordance with conflict of law rules, the claim will be adjudicated under
the substantive law of another jurisdiction.4"
Major J. interpreted the statute as merely curtailing Alberta adjudicative
jurisdiction over still-viable foreign actions that would be time-barred by
Alberta limitation periods. The act had no effect on the substantive validity
of the claim; it was simply a "legislative policy" limiting the circumstances
under which Alberta courts would entertain claims governed by foreign
law.

46

Bastarache J., alone in his judgment, declined to decide between two
possible interpretations of the section. The first of these was Major J.'s.
The second was that the section represented an attempt on the part of the
Alberta legislature to get around Tolofson, which had decided that in a
tort action, limitation periods, like all substantive law, should be assessed
under the lex loci delicti.47 Under this second interpretation, the statute
purported to extend the benefit of longer Alberta limitation periods to claims
that, under choice of law rules, would be time-barred by the lex causae.
Either way, Bastarache J. believed that the law had serious implications
for extraterritorial substantive rights. He applied the test that Imperial
Tobacco laid out. His view of the test was as follows. First the court must
determine the pith and substance of the section and the head of power
under which it falls. If this head of power is provincial, the court must
then consider whether this pith and substance enjoys a strong relationship
among the "enacting territory, the subject matter of the legislation and the
persons made subject to it" and also whether the section "pays respect to
'48
the legislative sovereignty of other territories.

44.
and
45.
46.
47.
48.

See Elizabeth Edinger, "British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco, Canada Ltd.: Extraterritoriality
Fundamental Principles" (2006) 43 Can. Bus. L.J. 301 at 306 for further discussion.
Limitations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-12, s. 12.
Castillo, supra note 8 at para. 5.
Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucan (Litigation Guardian) v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 [Tolofson].
Castillo, supra note 8 at para. 33.
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Following Tolofson's characterization of limitation periods as
substantive, Bastarache J. found that in pith and substance s. 12 of the
act related to civil rights under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.49
The Alberta Legislature could not simply re-classify limitation periods as
procedural to bring them under itsjurisdiction per s. 92(14), "Administration
of Justice in the Province." 50 Because laws relating to limitations are
substantive, they are subject to the Imperial Tobacco's test for the location
of intangible civil rights. Bastarache J. therefore sought a meaningful
connection between Alberta and the affected right. Significantly, he
was careful to articulate that "a real and substantial connection is not
equivalent to a meaningful connection as defined in ImperialTobacco."5 A
"meaningful connection" requires something more. He noted, further, that
"[t]he parties are making arguments that, should they be accepted, would
bring this court to conflate the constitutional threshold for adjudicative
jurisdiction and the constitutional threshold for legislative jurisdiction."52
The only connection that Bastarache J. could find between this substantive
provision and the enacting jurisdiction was a "real and substantial" one: it
applied whenever Alberta could properly take jurisdiction over a foreign
claim. This was not enough.
Bastarache J. believed that regardless of how it was interpreted,
the section purported to affect one of the parties' rights. If Major J.'s
interpretation was correct, it destroyed a plaintiff's right to bring suit. If
the Tolofson-dodge interpretation was correct, it destroyed a defendant's
right to be free from suit, while reviving the plaintiff's dead substantive
claim. 3 Despite the questionability of his conclusion on the former
interpretation, 4 Bastarache J.'s conclusion on the latter interpretation
seems unarguable, and for our purposes is the real point: the strictures on
extraterritorial effect disallow the alteration of substantive claims arising
in other jurisdictions.
. Aquick summary of the current Canadian law on provincial legislation's
extraterritorial effect is as follows. Because of s. 92 of the Constitution

49. Ibid. at para. 35. ConstitutionAct, 1867, supra note 16, s. 92(13).
50. Castillo, supra note 8 at par. 37; Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 16, s. 92(14).
51. Castillo, ibid. at para. 41.
52. Ibid. at para. 44. See also Edinger, supra note 44 at 310 on this point in Bastarache J.'sjudgment.
Unifund, supra note 8 at par. 58, has similar'things to say.
53. Castillo, ibid. at para. 47.
54. Declining to hear a case does not amount to destroying a substantive right, at least when there
are other-probably more appropriate-forums to hear the action. Major J.'s interpretation of the act
gives it the effective function of forcing the Alberta court to declare itself to beforum non conveniens
where its limitations periods would preclude the action if it were governed by Alberta law. The claim
itself is still valid, and not subject to any judgment that would preclude suit elsewhere.
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Act, 1867, 55 provinces legislate on matters "In each Province." If a
provincial statute or a section thereof is challenged on the grounds of
extraterritoriality, the court will first ascertain the legislation's pith and
substance. Assuming that this pith and substance falls under a s. 92
provincial head of power, the court will then determine whether the pith
and substance has a "meaningful connection" to the enacting jurisdiction.
This connection is significantly stronger than the connection needed to
validate adjudicative jurisdiction. Legislation's constitutional validity
requires, too, that it not trench on other provinces' sovereignty. What
this really all requires is the province's having a connection to the subject
matter that is closer than that of any other province. Even if a statute
or section is found in pith and substance to relate to matters "In each
Province" and therefore to be valid, it may be found to be constitutionally
inapplicable to subject matter to which it applies on its wording, but which
56
is more meaningfully connected to another jurisdiction.
III. Class actions as substantive law
Extraterritoriality concerns have received such short shrift in Canadian
jurisprudence in part because of the unscrutinized assumption that class
actions do not create or derogate from substantive rights. Writing in
Carom v. Bre-XMinerals Ltd., Winkler J. (as he then was) was dismissive
of the possibility that class action statutes have substantive effects:
The CPA [Class ProceedingsAct] is an entirely procedural statute. The
statute confers broad powers on the case management judge including
the jurisdiction to hear all motions in the proceeding. However, the Act
confers no substantive rights[.]57
The understanding Winkler J. evinces in Bre-Xis initially plausible. Craig
Jones captures the argument well:
Class proceedings are a means to a remedy, and most provisions in
the relevant legislation are not designed to affect substantive rights.
They do not make conduct that was previously lawful unlawful, they
simply permit a different avenue of recourse and, in so doing, engage
the economic advantages of aggregation in a way that will substantially
(indeed in many cases overwhelmingly) affect recovery. 8

55. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 16.
56. For a discussion between the difference between validity and applicability, see Unifund, supra
note 8 at para. 67, where Binnie J. refers to the appellant's argument about this distinction, and, to all
appearances, assumes it to be correct.
57. Carom v. Bre-XMinerals Ltd., [1999] 43 O.R. (3d) 441 (Gen. Div.) at para. 19 [Bre-X].
58. Jones (2003), supra note 2 at 160.
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Provincial class action statutes do not determine which substantive law
will determine the outcome of actions. In a multijurisdictional class action,
courts will apply standard choice of law rules to each claim.59 All that class
actions do, so the argument goes, is give pre-existing substantive rights
60
their day in court by allowing the aggregation of litigation costs.
This article's position, however, is that class actions do have effects that
fit within the law's understanding of what makes law substantive. On this
point, Tolofson is instructive. 6' One of the more specific questions that case
-had to answer was whether the law of limitations should be characterized
as substantive-in which case the limitation period of the place of the tort
was applicable-or procedural-in which case the limitation period of the
forum was applicable. The traditional common law position had been
that limitation periods related not to rights but to remedies, and so were
procedural law.62 In contrast, the civilian tradition held that "all statutes of
limitation destroy substantive rights. '63 La Forest J. denied the continuing
relevance of the old justifications for the common law approach and cited
relatively recent Canadian cases that had been "chipping away" at the
old rule by considering limitation periods as vesting rights against suit in
the defendant.' 4 La Forest J. made clear in Tolofson that from that point
forward, limitation periods would be considered substantive in Canadian
law.
Like limitation periods, class actions have preclusive effects on
claims. All class action regimes in Canada operate on an opt-out basis
within the province. This means that all residents fitting a class definition
are considered to be class members unless they take some positive step, as
defined by the court, to pull themselves out. The legislation in Ontario, for
example, provides as follows:

59. See, e.g., Wilson v. Servier CanadaInc. et al.[2000] 50 O.R. (3d) 219 (QL) (Sup. Ct. J.) at para.
83 [Wilson (2000)] and McNaughton Automotive Ltd. v. Co-operatives General Insurance Co., [2003]
O.J. No. 2914 (QL) (Sup. Ct. J.) at para. 37 [McNaughton]. In-depth discussion of choice of law issues
in multijurisdictional Canadian class actions can be found in Cassels,& Jones, supra note 2 at c. 9.
60. For discussion of the aggregative advantages of class actions-and of making classes as large as
possible-see generally Jones (2003), supra note 2 at c. 2-3; Owen M. Fiss, "The Political Theory of
the Class Action" (1996) 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 21.; David Rosenberg, "Mass Tort Class Actions:
What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't" (2000) 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 393; "Locating Investment
Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action" (2004) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2665.
For a good jurisprudential statement on aggregation's improvement of access to justice and deterrence
of wrongdoing, see Western CanadianShopping Centre Inc. v. Dutton, 2001 SCC 46, [2001] 2 S.C.R.
534 [Dutton] at paras. 26-29.
61. Tolofson, supra note 47.
62. Ibid. at para. 80.
63. Ibid. at para. 8 1.
64. Ibid. at paras. 82-85.
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9. Any member of a class involved in a class proceeding may opt out
of the proceeding 65in the manner and within the time specified in the
certification order.

All provincial class action legislation contains a similar provision. Consent
to membership, then, is not based on any positive action, but is instead
66
inferred from silence.
The effect of opt-out class actions is not only that potential plaintiffs
are able to benefit from the results of a court decision or settlement without
having to take any active steps; potential plaintiffs who have not positively
opted out are also barred from bringing future suits once a claim has been
resolved. The relevant sections of the Ontario Class ProceedingsAct are
these:
17. (1) Notice of certification of a class proceeding shall be given by
the representative party to the class members in accordance with this
section.
(6) Notice under this section shall, unless the court orders otherwise,

(f) state that the judgment, whether favourable or not, will bind all class
members who do not opt out of the proceeding.
27. (2) A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass does not
bind,
(a) a person who has opted out of the class proceeding; or
(b) aparty to the class proceeding in any subsequent proceeding between
the
party and a person mentioned in clause (a).
(3) Ajudgment on common issues of a class or subclass binds every class
member who has not opted out of the class proceeding, but only to the,
extent that the judgment determines common issues that,
(a) are set out in the certification order;
(b) relate to claims or defences described in the certification order; and

65. Class ProceedingsAct, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 9.
66. Richard A. Nagareda, "Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield
Revisited" (2008) 75 U. Chicago L. Rev. 603.
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(c) relate to relief sought by or from the class or subclass as stated in the
certification order.
29. (3) A settlement of a67class proceeding that is approved by the court
binds all class members.
These provisions mean that provincial class action legislation grants courts
the power to preclude class members from bringing any further claims
against defendants.
Some commentators have suggested that the real usefulness of notice
is to raise awareness of the action among enough plaintiffs to ensure
adequacy of representation. 68 Canadian courts, however, have generally
seen notice as the means by which to procure plaintiffs' consent-actual or
constructive-to join the aggregated claim. This thinking applies equally
to non-residents. Writing for the Ontario Divisional Court, Zuber J. wrote
in Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary(Canada) Limited that "It is clear
that the Ontario legislature and the Ontario courts are not simply imposing
jurisdiction on non-residents. Those outside the jurisdiction who are
included in the class are free to opt out in the same manner as those inside
Ontario may do."69 This demonstrates an understanding of opt-out rights
as creating the needed voluntariness for a court to take jurisdiction over
and determine the outcome of a plaintiff's substantive claim.
Courts' reliance on opt-out rights to create the consent needed to justify
the application of resjudicataseems poorly grounded. Courts are willing
to accept figures of less than 100% actual notice. In Currie
v. McDonalds
Restaurants of Canada, a case that refused enforcement of an Illinois
multijurisdictional settlement, Sharpe J.A. wrote that "if the right to opt
out is to be meaningful, the unnamed plaintiff must know about it and
that, in turn, implicates the adequacy of notice afforded to the unnamed
plaintiff."70 It is nearly impossible, however, to notify every affected party
of the suit. Courts will accept some degree of failure of notification as the
price to be paid for the benefits of class actions. The facts in Currie were
that only about 30% of potential Canadian plaintiffs would have received

67. Ontario Class Proceedings Act, supra note 65, ss. 17, 27 and 29.
68. See Fiss, supra note 60. For an example of a statutory provision relating to notice, see the
Ontario Class Proceedings Act, supra note 65, s. 17.
69. Nantais v. Telectronics Propietary (Canada) Limited (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 331 (Gen. Div.) (QL)
at 12 [Nantais].
70, Currie, supra note I I at para. 28. See, too, Hocking, supra note 5; and Ldpine, supra note 3
for similar expressions of an understanding of notice as a means of procuring consent. Jones (2003),
supra note 2, argues that the wide discretion that Canadian class action statutes grant to courts in
crafting notice may indicate what he calls a "public law," rather than a "private law" purpose for
notice. However, Canadian courts have been consistent in emphasizing the latter.
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7
notice of the American action, as opposed to 72% of American plaintiffs. 1
The former number was too low for Sharpe J.A. to accept that Ontarians
had been afforded a reasonable option to opt out, but all indications were
that he would have found the latter figure to be acceptable. Furthermore, as
Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller have demonstrated, in a typical
class action, fewer than 1% of potential class members exercise their optout rights.72 They write:

If class members only rarely object or opt-out, we might infer that in
many cases the right to opt-out is not very meaningful for class members.
This fact would seem to somewhat undermine the value of these rights,
as well as the functions allocated to them under existing law.73
Nagareda reports similarly low figures for settlement take-up rates-a fact
which is even more revealing.74 Many class action plaintiffs simply do not
know that their rights are being adjudicated, altered or vindicated. This
means that the court is willing to interfere with and alter the rights of
entirely unwitting parties.
Courts' power to terminate substantive rights in class actions
therefore do not come from plaintiffs' approaching the court to resolve
their claims. It does not even come from plaintiffs' declining to pull
out of an action. It comes simply from a statute, which itself therefore
affects plaintiffs' substantive rights. It is this concern which seems to
be animating the recent decision in Frey v. Bell Mobility Inc., in which
Gerein J. refused an application to modify a certification order to include
an opt-out extraprovincial class. Gerein J. decided that Saskatchewan's
recent introduction of opt-out extra-provincial classes into its class action
jurisdiction was a substantive change, reasoning, "[u]nder the initial
situation, a person could participate as a plaintiff only if that person
positively expressed a desire to do so. Now that person is automatically
included by reason of a unilateral action by the court."75 Further reasoning

71. Currie, ibid. at 35. In Dutton, supra note 60 at para. 49, McLachlin C.J. wrote that the
enforceability of a class action may demand 100% notification, but made no definitive pronouncement
on the question.
72. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, "The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues" (2004) 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1529 at 1532.
73. Ibid. at 1531.
74. See Nagareda, supra note 66 at 644-645 for discussion.
75. Frey v.Bell Mobility Inc., 2009 SKQB 165, [2009] S.J. No. 247 (QL) at para. 18.
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that substantive statutes do not have retroactive effect unless there is clear
legislative intent to the contrary, Gerein J. dismissed the application.76
It should be noted that for extraprovincial classes some provinces
make provision for opt-in, rather than opt-out classes. For example, s. 16
of the British Columbia Class ProceedingsAct, reads as follows:
16. (2) Subject to subsection (4), a person who is not a resident of
British Columbia may, in the manner and within the time specified
in the certification order made in respect of a class proceeding, opt
in to that class proceeding if the person would be, but for not being a
resident of British Columbia, a member of the class involved in the class
proceeding."
Opt-in provisions require active attornment on the part of plaintiffs. On the
above analysis, they are therefore better regarded as procedural provisions
providing for jurisdiction than as substantive provisions allowing courts to
alter substantive rights under the power of statute.
A second way in which class action legislation affects substantive
rights is by suspending the operation of limitation periods. For example, S.
28 of the Ontario act states that once a class proceeding begins, limitation
periods are suspended for all class members unless they opt out, their
certification motion fails or the class proceeding is dismissed, abandoned
or settled. Upon such occurrence, a limitation period picks up where it
left off.78 Tolofson, as we have seen, made clear that limitation periods
are substantive. Provisions such as this one, then, also affect substantive
rights by lengthening the time in which plaintiffs can bring claims and
putting off defendants' rights not to face action.
Class action legislation, then, has unmistakably substantive effects,
giving courts the power to preclude and lengthen claims. I described above
in Part II how a law's substantive status triggers the constitutional law of
76. Whether Gerein J.'s concern stemmed from the legislation's having been passed after the causes
of action arose or after the initial certification order is unclear. If the former, the logic of his position
would dictate that there could, in fact, be no opt-out class actions (uni- or multijurisdictional) including
claims that arose before the relevant class action legislation came into effect. In this regard, Gerein
J.'s decision on the issue of retroactivity contradicted the approach taken in early decisions such as
Bendalletal.v. McGhan Medical Corp etal. (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 734 (Gen. Div.).
77. Class ProceedingsAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50. Section 16(4) requires that there be an adequate
representative of the extraprovincial subclass. The other provincial statutes with opt-in national classes
are the Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, c. C- 18, the Class ProceedingsAct, S.A. 2003, c. C- 16.5 and
the Class Proceedings Act, S.N.B. 2006, c. C-5.15. The provincial statutes providing for opt-out
national classes are the Class ProceedingsAct, C.C.S.M. c. C 130, and the Class Actions Act, S.S.
200 1, c. C- 12.01 as amend. by S.S. 2007, c.2 1. The statutes making no explicit provision for national
classes are the Ontario Class ProceedingsAct, supranote 65, Code of Civil Procedure,R.S.Q. c. C-25,
Book IX, and the Class ProceedingsAct, S.N.S. 2007, c. 28.
78. Ontario Class ProceedingsAct, supra note 65, s. 28.

270

The Dalhousie Law Journal

extraterritoriality. It would therefore be surprising to find that the case
law and secondary literature on national classes lacked a full discussion
of extraterritoriality's implications for national classes. However, as the
following section will suggest, such a gap is exactly what we find.
IV. Views on the national class and the constitution
Discussion of the constitutionality national classes in Canada has almost
invariably focused on the issue of jurisdiction. This began with Nantais,7 9
and has continued with precious few exceptions up to the present day,
both in jurisprudential and academic writings. It is not my intention to
go over the cases' jurisdictional discussions in great detail, or to assess
them. The cases explicitly dealing with the constitutional implications of
national classes have received quite complete. treatment in the literature,8 °
and academics have offered varying takes on how the courts have treated
the adjudicative jurisdiction issue. What I do want to do is to show how
the cases have framed the constitutional discussion in jurisdictional terms
and, for the most part, ignored the issue of extraterritoriality. Furthermore,
the courts have set the parameters of the constitutional discourse in the
secondary literature, which I will show largely to suffer from the same
limitation of scope as does the jurisprudence.
1. The cases
Questions of constitutionality have arisen since the birth of national classes
in Canada. In Nantais, the first Canadian case to certify a national class,
Brockenshire J. framed the issue that the defendants raised like this:
Can a court, under this Ontario statute, include in a proposed class,
members outside of Ontario, who have not specifically requested
inclusion, so that they would be prevented from taking action in their
own jurisdictions?"'
The question involved aspects of constitutionality and of statutory
interpretation, since the Ontario Class Proceedings Act is silent on the
matter of multijurisdictional classes. Brockenshire J. treated the two
questions in the same short analysis, assessing them on the standard

79. Nantais, supra note 69.
80. Lamont, supra note 2; Jones (2003), supra note 2 at 161-182; Morrison, Gertner & Afarian,
supra note 2; Cassels & Jones, supra note 2 at 449-459.
81. Nantais, supra note 69 at 4.

The National Class as Extraterritorial Legislation

of whether it was "plain and obvious" that the national class should be
disallowed. 2
His analysis did not wrestle with any constitutional issues at alljurisdictional or extraterritorial-and was focused more on the potential
benefits of national classes. He took from Hunt the proposition that "the
federal government had power and authority to solve any problems" to do
with multijurisdictional litigation-a slightly faulty understanding of what
Hunt actually says-and then quoted Hunt on the subject of provincial
powers to legislate with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments:
[S]ubject to these overriding powers [of federal competence] I see no
reason why the provinces should not be able to legislate in the area,
subject, however, to the principles in Morguardand to the demands on
territoriality as expounded in the cases. 3
Brockenshire J. took the quotation as giving leeway to the provinces
to legislate with respect to national problems, and then continued by citing
the potential benefits of national classes, concluding that such classes are,
indeed, available under the Ontario statute.
The quotation from Hunt, however, had more to say than Brockenshire
J. acknowledged. In it, La Forest J. had been careful not to give provinces
carte blanche to legislate outside "the demands on territoriality as
expounded in the cases." In Hunt itself, this phrase was followed by "most
recently in Reference Re Upper Churchill Rights Reversion Act." 4 La
Forest J.'s reference to a case about extraterritoriality when discussing
the. issue of legislating on judgment enforcement should have alerted
Brockenshire J. to the concern of extraterritorial legislation, which is an
ever-present concern in provincial statutes touching on multijurisdictional
issues. A second important point coming from the quotation is the care La
Forest J. took in differentiating between "the principles in Morguard'and
"the demands on territoriality." They are not the same thing. The former
principles establish when the courts of a province can determine rights.
The latter principles establish how a provincial legislature can create or
alter them.
Conflation of the two ideas-or, more accurately, subordination of
extraterritoriality to the law of jurisdiction---quickly became a common
82. Ibid. at 11. Lamont, supra note 2 points out that the application of the "plain and obvious"
standard to the question of whether national classes were unavailable under the Ontario statute was an
error. That standard was only applicable to the motion alleging that the statement of claim disclosed
no valid cause of action, which Brockenshire J. also dealt with in the judgment.
83. Hunt, supra note I at para. 60, quoted in Nantais, supra note 69 at 1I.
84. Hunt, supra note I at para. 60, referring to Churchill Falls,supra note 20.
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theme in the jurisprudence. Even in dismissing leave to appeal the
decision to the Ontario Divisional Court, Zuber J. wrote that "it may be
asked what is the reach of the Ontario legislature and the Ontario courts
acting under it,"85 referring to the two separate notions between which La
Forest J. differentiated in the above quotation from Hunt. But as soon as
they were brought up, they were amalgamated. The following paragraph
reads, "It is clear that the Ontario legislature and the Ontario courts are
not simply imposing jurisdiction on non-residents. Those outside the
jurisdiction who are included in the class are free to opt out in the same
manner as those inside Ontario may do."86 Whether opt-out rights took
care of the jurisdiction problem or not, the possibility that the Ontario
Class ProceedingsAct confers or detracts from substantive rights was far
from view.
In Bre-X,87 Winkler J. continued this trend. His was the first national
class action decision to tackle constitutional questions in detail, but despite
the depth of his analysis, he overlooked the question of extraterritoriality
just as Brockenshire J. and Zuber J. had done in Nantais. After first
accepting Nantais's holding on the interpretation of the Ontario Class
ProceedingsAct, Winkler J. turned
to the question of whether the legislation in the present circumstances
is constrained by constitutional considerations and the principle of
territoriality. The defendants submit that the Canadian constitution
empowers the legislature of the province to make laws in respect of
property and civil rights or the administration of justice within the
province. However, they contend that the Ontario legislature has no
constitutional authority to affect civil rights8 outside'of the province or to
confer power on an Ontario court to do so. 1
Winkler J.'s description of the defendants' submissions indicated that
they had attacked national classes on the grounds of both adjudicative and
legislative jurisdiction. They mentioned both the power of the Ontario
courts and the power of the Ontario legislature. In reference to the latter,
Winkler J. indicated that the defendants had pleaded important cases on

85. Nantais, supra note 69 at 13. The Ontario Divisional Court's refusal of leave is reported in an
appendix to Nantais in the Ontario Reports.
86. Ibid.
87. Bre-X, supra note 57.
88. Ibid. at para. 27.
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extraterritoriality such as Royal Bank v. The King,89 ChurchillFalls9" and
InterprovincialCo-operativesLimited v. Dryden Chemicals Limited.9'
However, Winkler J. did not engage with these cases. Nor did he
give any serious consideration to the notion of class actions as affecting
substantive rights, having previously referred to class actions statutes as
"purely procedural."92 Directly after mentioning the defendants' reliance
on Churchill Falls and Interprovincial Co-operatives, he wrote, "The
decisions in Morguard and Hunt require Canadian courts to apply the
principle of territoriality in the context of the Canadian federal system."93
Once mentioned, these two cases dominated the analysis. After going over
their holdings, Winkler J. wrote in summary that "Morguard and Hunt
permit the extra-territorial application of legislation where the enacting
province has a real and substantial connection wvith the subject matter of
the action and it accords with order and fairness to assume jurisdiction." 94
He then listed the contacts between the defendant Bre-X and Ontario, and
concluded, "I am therefore satisfied that there is a 'real and substantial
connection' between the defendants and the subject matter of the actions
to Ontario, thus meeting that requirement in Morguard and Hunt for the
assumption-ofjurisdiction." 95 Over the course of the judgment, two separate
constitutional arguments had become one. Extraterritoriality, in Winkler
J.'s analysis, seemed to be just another word for appropriate assumption
of jurisdiction. Indeed, he was so focused on jurisdictional issues that
he was able to dismiss two of the defendants' constitutional arguments
without even referring to the constitution. The first argument was that
s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act, 96 which suspends limitation periods
between the commencement of the action and the certification decision,
could not apply to absent plaintiffs' claims. Winkler J. answered this
by stating that if extraprovincial class members are to be bound by class
settlements or judgments, they should also benefit from the provisions on
limitation periods. 97 I have already proposed in Part III that the provisions
on limitation periods and on the binding effect of judgments are indeed

89. Royal Bank v. The King, supra note 19.
90. ChurchillFalls, supra note 20.
91. InterprovincialCo-operativesLtd. v. Dryden Chemicals Ltd., [1976] I S.C.R. 477 [Interprovincial
Co-operatives].
92. Bre-X, supranote 57 at para. 19.
93. Ibid. at para. 28.
94. Ibid. at para. 33.
95. Ibid. at para. 36. For a view that commonality of issues creates a real and substantial connection,
see Harringtonv. Dow Corning (1997), 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 88 (S.C.) [Harrginton].
96. Ontario Class ProceedingsAct, supra note 65, s. 28.
97. Bre-X, supranote 57 at para. 44.
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linked, but because they are both substantive, not because they confer
correlative burdens and benefits.
Winkler J. also referred to another of the defendants' extraterritorial
arguments, which held that,
because all of the members of the class are not known, in the case of
non-resident plaintiffs it cannot be assumed, by reason of their not
opting out, that those plaintiffs wish to participate in the class action.
In consequence they state the act cannot be applied extra-territorially to
affect such plaintiff's property and civil rights in the absence of a specific
attomment to the jurisdiction. 8
The basic premise of the argument is that foreign plaintiffs who willingly
litigate in a particular forum are agreeing to be bound by that forum's
decision, which will therefore have the effect of res judicata. In the
case of class actions, though, plaintiffs have done nothing to attorn to
the jurisdiction that is affecting their rights. The Ontario legislature has
conferred this power on the courts, which then have the ability to curtail
civil rights located in other provinces. This is substantially similar to the
discussion this paper will present in Part V.
Winkler J. dismissed the argument summarily. Having decided that
Ontario properly had jurisdiction over the foreign claims (which under
his analysis meant that Ontario legislation was applicable), he stated that
"a necessary corollary of this court's assumption of jurisdiction is the
application of Ontario legislation to the proceedings." Despite their clearly
having been pleaded, class actions' effects on extraterritorial civil rights
seemed to be of little concern to the court. For Winkler J., all constitutional
doubts were answered by establishing the propriety of the court's taking
adjudicative jurisdiction over the multijurisdictional claims.
The next case to certify a multijurisdictional class did so internationally.
This was Robertson v. Thomson Corp,99 which offered no discussion on
constitutional issues beyond declining to consider the enforceability of
Ontario national classes in foreign jurisdictions. In the short judgment
in Webb v. K-Mart Canada Ltd. 0 0 Brockenshire J. took for granted that
Nantais and Bre-Xhad established the constitutionality of national classes,
despite the fact that neither case had really engaged with the extraterritorial
issue. The constitutional analysis was therefore limited to finding a "real
and substantial connection" between the national claim and Ontario.

98. Ibid. at para. 47.
99. Robertson v. Thomson Corp. (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 161 (Gen. Div.) [Robertson].
100. Webb v. K-Mart CanadaLtd. (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 389 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Webb].
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Although the case's reasoning on jurisdiction over the claim as a
whole contains much fodder for discussion, I will restrict my comments
to a statement that follows the passage on adjudicative jurisdiction.
Brockenshire J. wrote,
Obviously, fromthe points of view of both the national corporation and
its employees across the nation, there should not be great disparities
in treatment arising solely from an accident of geography. The lack
of comparable class action legislation elsewhere in Canada, except for
British Columbia and Quebec, is a telling argument for extending the
reach of the Ontario legislation.... Here, I regard the common interests
of the class members, the commercial realities of the situation, and
the broad objectives of the Ontario Act, as outweighing any concerns
expressed over extra territorial involvement of the Ontario Court.''
The entire quotation bespeaks a rather cavalier attitude towards
constitutional concerns: class actions are good policy, and the entire nation
should benefit from them, on Ontario's terms. The sentiment echoed what
Winkler J. had said to close his judgment in Bre-X:
The plaintiffs allege a mass wrong transcending provincial boundaries
involving the sale of Bre-X shares in Canada largely in Ontario. The
class definition including non-resident plaintiffs, as proposed by the
plaintiffs, meets the aims of the CPA of promoting access to justice,
judicial economy and the modification of behaviour of wrongdoers.I°2
I am far from suggesting that a judicial desire to spread the benefits of
class actions nationally is leading judges to ignore the requirements of
the constitution intentionally, but it may, at the very least, be one factor in
explaining why the extraterritorial affect of class actions on substantive
rights has received such short shrift when it has come up, and why
constitutional focus has largely been on the more flexible subject of court
jurisdiction.
Two judgments in Wilson v. Servier CanadaInc. etal.103 offered further
analysis of the constitutional implications of national classes. The case
concerned weight loss drugs, Ponderal and Redux, which were alleged
to cause hypertension and valvular heart disease. At the time of the 2000
certification decision, the defendants were Servier, the Quebec distributor,
and Biofarma, Servier's French parent corporation. The proposed class
definition included "All persons resident in Canada who were prescribed
101. Ibid. at 10.
102. Bre-X, supranote 57 at para. 56.
103. Wilson (2000), supra note 59; and Wilson v. Servier CanadaInc. (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 656, (Sup.
Ct. J.) [Wilson (2002)].
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and ingested the diet drugs marketed under the brand name Ponderal and/
or Redux."' ° Much like the defendant had done in Bre-X, the defendants
in this case raised the separate issues of whether the CPA was ultra vires
the Ontario legislature and whether the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction
over non-residents' claims. 105 Cumming J. evinced an understanding
that these are two distinct issues. He began his consideration of the first
issue by referring to the provincial heads of power under which class
action legislation might fall: s. 92(13), "Property and Civil Rights in the
Province"; s. 92(14), "The Administration of Justice in the Province"; and
s. 92(16), "Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the
Province." He then referred to Churchill Falls for the proposition that
"the pith and substance of provincial legislation must relate to matters
within provincial legislative powers, while extraprovincial effects must be
16
merely collateral or incidental."'
Thus far, Cumming J. was talking in real territorial terms. Indeed,
later he quoted Winkler J. in Bre-X as stating that "Morguard and Hunt
permit the extra-territorial application of legislation where the enacting
province has a real and substantial connection with the subject matter ...
and it accords with order and fairness to assume jurisdiction."' 07 Cumming
J. seemed uncomfortable with this understanding of Morguard and Hunt.
He wrote,
I prefer to restate this view of the law as follows. Morguard and Hunt
stand for the proposition that if there is a real and substantial connection
between the subject matter of the action and Ontario, then the Ontario
court has jurisdiction with respect to the litigation and can apply Ontario's
procedural law. Ontario may not necessarily apply its substantive law
since there must be a determination of the choice of law that applies.'0 8
This statement of the law. as the Supreme Court has set it out was
unimpeachable. There was no conflation of principles as we see in
the earlier cases, but Cumming J. still dismissed the extraterritoriality
challenge. This was because his understanding was that "the CPA is
procedural and remedial in nature." Extraterritoriality was not a problem
because class actions affect only remedies, not rights. He therefore
followed the examples that Nantais, Bre-X, Robertson and Webb set, and
looked no further after finding a real and substantial connection between
104.
105.
106.
107.
note
108.

Wilson (2000), ibid. at para. 54.
Ibid.at 58.
Ibid. at 61.
Cumming J. reproduces this quotation in ibid. at 82. The quotation itself is from Bre-X, supra
57, at para. 33.
Wilson (2000) supra note 59 at para. 83.
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the claim and Ontario.'0 9 The constitutional discussion in Wilson (2002)
was substantially similar, to the extent of being identical word-for-word in
certain passages.
More recent is Brito v. Pfizer CanadaInc., where, in addition to an
argument based on jurisdiction, the defendants made a clear extraterritorial
argument:
[L]es membres visds par la requdte qui resident A l'extdrieur du Qudbec
pourraient se voir entrainer dans un recours collectifcontre leur gr6 et sans
en 6trc informds. Ce serait cette inclusion par ddfaut des membres absents
et ses consdquences - l'autoritd de la chose jugde du jugement final - qui
conf~rerait aux dispositions attaqudes le caract~re extraterritorial qui les
rend constitutionnellement inapplicables dans les circonstances" °

The defendants further argued that these extraterritorial concerns might
be met were Quebec to allow only for opt-in extraprovincial classes,
or were extraprovincial classes to be abandoned in favour of parallel
provincial ones."' Grenier J. began her analysis by stating that class action
legislation does indeed affect residents of other provinces, but went on to
state that such effects are incidental and relate to adjudicative jurisdiction,
paying little attention to the issue of extraterritoriality. Because of this
jurisdictional focus, Grenier J. sought simply to find a real and substantial
connection between the cause of action and the province of Quebec. So
long as the Qudbdcois legislation did not permit exorbitant jurisdiction,
its constitutionality was assured. In support of this proposition she cited
Unifund.l 2 That case, however, had dealt only with the applicability of
substantive law, and had carefully distinguished between this and the
law of adjudicative jurisdiction. Indeed, she made clear that she was
not thinking of the effects of Quebec's class action legislation on extraprovincial rights by writing that "malgrd l'existence d'un lien suffisant
eu 6gard A la competence d'un ressort A l'6gard d'un litige, ce lien peut
toutefois ne pas tre suffisant pour que les lois de ce ressort ddcident de
l'issue du litige." 3 Of course it is correct that the law of other provinces
may apply to substantive claims. But implicit in Grenier J.'s dismissal
of the extraterritorial argument was an understanding that Quebec's class
action legislation itself had no extraterritorial substantive effects. In this
her analysis resembled the analyses offered a decade earlier in Nantais
109. Ibid. at para. 90.
110. Brito c. Pfizer Canada inc., 2008 QCCS 2231, [2008] R.J.Q. 1420 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 91
[Brito].
I11.Ibid. at paras..127 and 136.
112. Ibid.atparas. 111-113..
113. Ibid. atpara. 123.
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and Bre-X. The main question was one of real and substantial connection.
The issue of class actions' substantive extraterritorial effects was not in
the picture.
Despite the above jurisprudence, however, current judicial opinion
4
does not seem to be unanimous. In Englund v. Pfizer Canada Inc.,"
Klebuc J. (as he then was) declined to stay a Saskatchewan provincial
class action that could soon be covered by an Ontario national class. The
Ontario class had not yet been certified, so Klebuc J. considered the motion
to staypremature. He also demonstrated some hostility to the idea of the
national class:
I reject BI Canada's submission that the Ontario CPA allows for the
creation of a "national class" that binds non-Ontario residents unless
they opt out of a class action certified in Ontario because the laws of
Saskatchewan do not recognize legislation enabled by other jurisdictions
that intentionally encroaches on the right of its residents to seek judicial
recourse for losses they suffered as a consequence of a tort or other
breach of the law committed within the Province.l"5
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal reversed Klebuc J.'s ruling, but without
engaging with his discussion of the notion of class actions' extraterritorial
effects. In his discussion, Klebuc J.'s thinking seemed to be in line with the
thinking that has animated this article. Class actions preclude substantive
claims, meaning that discussion of their constitutional status cannot limit
itself to jurisdiction.
Also significant is Bich J.A.'s recent judgment in Hocking, a case in
which a split Qu6bec Court ofAppeal denied recognition of an Ontario class
settlement. In a long discussion in obiter she raised several constitutional
doubts about national classes. After a long introduction to the law of
extraterritoriality, referring especially to Morguard,"6 Tolofson" 7 and
Unifund,"8 she focused much of her discussion on issues of adjudicative
jurisdiction, and on the Ontario court's having ignored questions of
choice of law with regard to the mortgages and hypotheques at issue.

114. Englund v. Pfizer Canada Inc. (2006), 274 Sask. R. 172 (Q.B.) [Pfizer (2006)]; reversed, Englund
v.Pfizer Canada Inc. (2007), 299 Sask R. 298 (C.A.).
115. Pfizer (2006) ibid. at para. 44. It should be noted that part of Klebuc J.'s
aversion to the notion
of a national class covering Sakatchewan may stem from the faulty assumption that a national class
would preclude Saskatchewan claimants from using Saskatchewan law should the class action get to
trial. See para. 43. It should also be noted that Klebuc J. was later quite comfortable with the notion of
a national class in Wutunee v. Merck Frosst Canada Ltd., 2008 SKQB 229, reversed in Merck Frosst
Canada Ltd. v. Wuttunee, 2009 SKCA 43.
116. Morguard, supra note 6.
117. Tolofson, supra note 47.
118. Unifund, supra note 8.
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This application of Ontarian substantive law had violated extraterritorial
principles." 9 Of greater relevance to this article are statements Bich J.A.
made at the end of her discussion. Moving on to what she called "un
autre ordre d'ides," 2z she cited a passage from Branch and Rhone, asking
"does the removal of this right to sue [on a provincial substantive claim]
not come within the local province's jurisdiction to govern property and
civil rights?"' 2' She then drew from her earlier discussion of the law of
extraterritoriality, asking as follows:
[C]omment, en effet, le tribunal 6tranger, tribunal de l'Ontario en
l'occurrence, peut-il constitutionnellement imposer Ades non-rdsidents,
et plus exactement Adesjusticiables qui ne rel~vent pas de sa competence
et n'ont pas eux-m~mes saisi22ce for, l'obligation de s'exclure du recours
collectif institud devant lui?

Here, the constitutional issue for Bich J.A. was a province's grant of power
to its courts to curtail extraprovincial substantive claims. Furthermore, in
Bich J.A.'s view, arguments about the efficacy of national classes or about
the need to avoid conflicting judgments on the same matter may well be
insufficient to get around the problem of national classes' contravention of
hard and fast constitutional principles.' 23 However, she declined to render
a definite opinion on the constitutional questions she had raised, as the
parties had not framed their arguments in constitutional terms. She went
on to deny recognition of the Ontario decision on other grounds, and in
this was joined by Baudouin J.A., who himself declined to venture any
24
opinion on the constitutional points his colleague had raised.
2. Academic commentary
Taking their cue from the Ontario cases, most Canadian commentators
on the constitutionality of national classes have focused on the issues of
original or enforcement jurisdiction. Stephen Lamont for example, gives
a searching critical analysis of the bases on which Ontario and British
Columbia courts have found a "real and substantial connection" between
the forum and extraprovincial plaintiffs.125 On the enforcement side, Jones
119. Hocking, supra note 5 at paras. 150-157. In herjudgment in Brito, supra note 110 at para. 123,
Grenier J. indicated an understanding that this was the key issue for Bich J.A. For a case that refused
certification of a multi-jurisdictional class because of the complex choice of law issues such a class
would introduce see McNaughton, supranote 59.
120. Hocking, ibid. at para. 159.
121. Ibid., citing Branch & Rhone, supra note 2 at 15.
122. Ibid. at para. 160.
123. Ibid. at para. 164.
124. Ibid. at paras. 247-249.
125. Lamont, supranote 2.
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and Baxter

26

enforcement,

and Monestier
28

27

offer commentary on recent cases denying

while Poltak1 and Walker 3 ° offer broader discussions of
29

enforcement beginning with first principles.
In the Canadian literature, reference to potential extraterritorial
concerns has been uncommon. F. Paul Morrison, Eric Gertner and
Hovsep Afarian raise the issue of legislative extraterritoriality in their
article on "the possible demise of the national class in Canada"-a
demise which they see arising from constitutional concerns.' 3' After
going over the reasons of Nantais,3 Bre-X,'33 Webb, 134 Wilson (2000)'
and Harrington,' the authors move on to a potential problem that these
cases missed: "A provincial legislature has no competence to legislate
extra-territorially."' 137 They then refer to Churchill Falls,'1 and to the "in

the Province" qualification on s. 92(13) (property and civil rights) and s.
92(16) (matters of a merely local and private nature).' They follow this
introduction, however, by writing that "[t]he territoriality test, based on
the notion of the pith and substance legislation as opposed to its incidental
effect, is... subsumed by the real and substantial connection test."' 14 They
do mention Unifund,'4' but the rest of their argument takes the form of a
criticism of the previously mentioned judgments' treatment of the "real and
substantial connection" test coming out of Morguardand Hunt. Mention
of extraterritorial creation or alteration of substantive rights, which is what
an extraterritorial analysis should really concern itself with, is missing.
Like the judges in Nantais and Bre-X, the authors begin with a question
based in the law of extraterritoriality, but give an answer based in the law
of adjudicative jurisdiction.
Coming closer to the position suggested in this article are two papers,
one by Ward Branch and Christopher Rhone and another by Colin Irving and
126. Jones & Baxter, supra note 2.
127. Monestier, supra note 2.
128. That is, Currie, supra note 11, Canada Post Corporationv. Lpine, 2007 QCCA 1092, and
HSBC Bank Canada c. Hocking, 2006 QCCS 330.
129. Poltak, supra note 2.
130. Walker (2008), supra note 2.
131. Morrison, Gertner & Afarian, supra note 2.
132. Nantais, supra note 69.
133. Bre-X, supra note 57.
134. Webb, supranote 100.
135. Wilson (2000), supra note 59.
136. Harrington,supra note 95.
137. Morrison, Gertner & Afarian, supranote 2.
138. ChurchillFalls, supra note 20.
139. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 16.
140. Morrison, Gertner & Afarian, supra note 2 at 79.
141. Unifund, supra note 8.
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Mathieu Bouchard. For their part, Branch and Rhone clearly differentiate
extraterritoriality from adjudicative jurisdiction, and query whether an
Ontario statute can require non-residents to take active steps in the form
of opting out to preserve their rights from determination in an Ontario
action, but mention this only as a side note and do not seek to advance
any analysis on the issue.'42 In a short and tightly argued article, 143 Colin
Irving and Mathieu Bouchard present an analysis similar to that suggested
here, pointing to class action legislation's effects on the validity of claims
146
14
and then raising Royal Bank v. The King,'" Ladore, Churchill Falls
and Unifund,147 which lead them to conclude that "a provincial statute
authorizing an opt-out class action is unconstitutional to the extent that it
applies to non residents of that province.... It cannot be said that a court
has acted within its jurisdiction when its judgment is based on a statute
which is unconstitutional on its face, or which has been interpreted so as
' 48
to make it unconstitutional.'
Craig Jones, too, recognizes that class action legislation has substantive
effects both by suspending limitation periods and. by binding potential
plaintiffs to actions to which they have not consented. 49 He seems
to accept, without engaging in much discussion on the topic, that the
application of class action legislation nationally does offend the strictures
on extraterritoriality. However, where Jones's real interest lies is in getting
around the problem. Since this is the real focus of his discussion, I will
hold off on further description of what he has to say until the following
sections, where I offer my own thoughts on the constitutional implications
of class actions' substantive character.
"3. Conclusions
In many Canadian analyses of the national classes, constitutional concerns of
extraterritoriality take a back seat to constitutional concerns ofjurisdiction.
There are several potential explanations for this. In Nantais,Bre-X, Webb

142. Branch& Rhone, supranote 2 at 11 - 12. Branch and Rhone regret the fact that the extraterritoriality
issue is unlikely to come before appellate review. Before class action legislation was widespread in
Canada, defendants had reason to challenge national classes. If their challenges were successful, they
would be immune from aggregated actions in much of the country. However, now that class action
legislation exists in almost every province, they argue, a successful challenge would simply result in a
costly multiplicity of provincial proceedings. The incentive for constitutional challenge is gone.
143. Irving & Bouchard, supra note 2.
144. Royal Bank v. The King, supra note 19
145. Ladore, supra note 19.
146. Churchill Falls,supra note 20.
147. Unifund,supra note 8.
148. Irving & Bouchard, supra note 2 at 120.
149. Jones (2003), supra note 2 at 161.
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and Brito, and in Morrison, Gertner and Afarian's paper, the jurisdictional
focus was due in large part to the view that legislative extraterritoriality
was governed by Morguardand Hunt. Bre-X, especially, seemed to suffer
from this misunderstanding. Brockenshire J.'s judgments in Nantais and
Webb also focused on the benefits of class actions and the desirability of
extending these benefits across the country. Such concerns may well have
distracted focus from countervailing constitutional issues. In Wilson,
extraterritorial concerns faded into the background because Cumming j.
thought of class actions in purely procedural terms. In all this case law, the
constitutional status of national classes has been all but assured, such that
Janet Walker has been able to write with confidence that "there is simply
no credible challenge to be made to the basic jurisdiction of Canadian
courts to certify multijurisdiction class actions."' ° The following section
presents just such a challenge.
V. Class actions as extraterritoriallegislation
In Part III, this paper established the substantive character of class actions'
preclusive effects. Class action legislation grants courts the power to
terminate potential plaintiffs' substantive rights, while simultaneously
vesting in defendants a right not to be sued. Courts have the power to do this
without a plaintiff's knowledge or express consent. Class action statutes
also grant courts the power to suspend limitation periods. In class action
legislation, as in Imperial Tobacco and Castillo, provincial legislatures are
legislating with respect to civil rights under s. 92(13). Such legislation,
therefore, will be subject to the constraints of extraterritoriality.
Some provincial class action legislation makes specific provision
for the preclusion of extraprovincial claims. The relevant sections in the
Saskatchewan Class Actions Act,' 5 ' for example, read as follows:
6.1 (1) The court may make any order it considers appropriate in an
application to certify a multi-jurisdictional class action, including the
following:
(a) an order certifying the action as a multi-jurisdictional class action
if:
(i) the criteria set out in subsection 6(1) have been satisfied; and
(ii) having regard to subsections 6(2) and (3), the court determines
that Saskatchewan is the appropriate venue for the multijurisdictional class action;
28 (1)A judgment on common issues of a class or subclass binds every
150. Walker (2008), supra note 2 at 459.
151. Saskatchewan Class Actions Act, supra note 77.
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member of the class or subclass, as the case may be, who has not opted
out of the class action, but only to the extent that the judgment determines
common issues that:
(a) are set out in the certification order;

(b) relate to claims described in the certification order; and
(c) relate to relief sought by the class or subclass as stated in the
certification order.
(2) Ajudgment on common issues of a class or subclass does not bind a
party to the class action in any subsequent action between the party and
a person who opted out of the class action.
38 (4) A settlement of a class action or .ofcommon issues affecting a
subclass that is approved by the court binds every member of the class or
subclass who has not opted out of the class action, but only to the extent
provided by the court.
The combined effect of these provisions is to give the court the power
to alter the substantive rights of non-residents of Saskatchewan. The
Ontario statute, 5 2 which makes no direct reference to extraprovincial
class members, has been interpreted to have extraterritorial reach, and so
the same effect as other provincial statutes that make their extraterritorial
effect more explicit.'53
In both cases, the constitutional inapplicability analysis of Unifund
seems more appropriate than the pith and substance- analysis of Imperial
Tobacco and Bastarache J.'s judgment in Castillo. The statutes as
whole entities are not directed in pith and substance at extraterritorial
rights. Winkler J. states in Bre-X that class action legislation is "purely
procedural."' 54 One of the tasks of this article has been to demonstrate
that this is not entirely correct. Still, a description of "mostly procedural"
might still be appropriate. Class actions allow for the aggregation of
claims, and relate less to rights than they do to the manner in which they
can be vindicated. This would place the statutes as a whole under s. 92(14)
of the ConstitutionAct, 1867:
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in
relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,(14) The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the
Constitution, Maintenance and Organization of Provincial Courts, both
152. Ontario Class ProceedingsAct, supra note 65.
153. Nantais, supra note 69 at 12.
154. Bre-X, supra note 57 at para. 19.
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of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil
Matters.
Likewise, no particular section appears to be aimed at extraterritorial civil
rights, even in the statutes that make specific provision for the certification
of extraprovincial .classes. In Saskatchewan's statute, for example, s.
6.1(1) permits the court to "make any order it considers appropriate in
an application to certify a multi-jurisdictional class action."' By itself,
this provision relates not to the substantive claims to be precluded, but
simply to adjudication itself. Following Major J.'s analysis in Castillo, it
falls under s. 92(14) and is intra vires the province. 116 It may be that these
provisions do violate Morguard and Hunt's constitutional requirement
of a real and substantial connection for adjudicative jurisdiction. Bich
J.A.'s judgment in Hocking'5 7 certainly points to this possibility, while the
judgments in Nantais,5 8 Bre-X' 5 9 and Harrington,160 and L~pine,16 1 -inter
alia, point the other way. Consideration of the arguments on either side
falls outside the scope of this article, but readers should at least be alert
to the possibility that national classes may be unconstitutional for reasons
other than extraterritoriality.
62
Sections such as ss. 28 and 38(4) of the Saskatchewan act,
quoted above, also do not seem to be in pith and substance directed at
extraterritorial rights. They are similar to the recovery provisions in the
Ontario InsuranceAct 63 which were the subject of Unifund. They make
no particular reference to extraterritorial effect, and so seem, in pith
and substance, to be directed at Saskatchewan rights. The same could
be said of the Ontario provisions relating to preclusive effect."64 Under a
Unifund analysis, though, they may still be inapplicable to extraterritorial
rights. As described aboYe, Unifund focuses on the right in question. The
analysis looks to "the relationship among the enacting jurisdiction, the
subject matter of the legislation and the individual or entity sought to be
regulated by it.' 65 This is what I have called a kind of "strong Morguard
test," which looks for the "most real and substantial connection." This
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Saskatchewan Class Actions Act, supra note 77, s. 6.1 (1).
Castillo, supra note 8 at para. 5.
Hocking, supra note 5.
Nantais, supranote 69.
Bre-X, supra note 57.
Harrington,supra note 95.
LUpine, supranote 3.
Saskatchewan Class Actions Act, supra note 77.
Ontario InsuranceAct, supra note 27.
Ontario Class ProceedingsAct, supranote 65, ss. 27 and 29.
Unifund,supra note 8 at para. 56.
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also accords with Imperial Tobacco's later concern for the "legislative
166
sovereignty.of other territories."'
An application of these principles to the preclusion provisions of
provincial class actions statutes yields a clear result. Let us take the
situation in Wilson (2000). 167 There, the Ontario court certified a national
class of plaintiffs who had been adversely affected by pharmaceuticals
produced by a French corporation with a Qudbrcois distributor. In the
case of Ontario plaintiffs, the dual requirements of strongest connection
to Ontario and respect for other provinces' sovereignty would be met.
But what of plaintiffs in other provinces who were included in the class?
Many of these plaintiffs would have had no connection to Ontario, had
suffered their harm outside Ontario and had consumed products unrelated
to Ontario. Yet the Ontario court, enabled by an Ontario statute, included
these plaintiffs in a national class. Many of the plaintiffs would not have
even known of this or of any resulting settlement, yet the application of
the Ontario statute would have precluded their ability to sue. Ontario
legislation had killed the claims.
Furthermore, by taking over the extraprovincial plaintiffs' claims,
Ontario was interfering with other provinces' ability to alter their own
citizens' rights. Brockenshire J. underscored the serious nature of the
interference in Webb when he explicitly extended the benefits of class
actions to provinces where they were then still unavailable.' 68 In the
current legal landscape, this concern may be less pressing, now that most
Canadian jurisdictions have class action legislation in place, but this does
not minimize the results of the analysis. This is the kind of extraterritorial
application of provincial legislation that Unifund disallows.
The extension of extraterritorial limitation periods is similarly
impermissible. The only case to deal with the issue explicitly was Bre-X.
As noted above in Part IV, Winkler J. wrote as follows:
The defendants also argue that s. 28 of the CPA [Class Proceedings
Act], which provides for the suspension of limitation periods upon
commencement of a class proceeding, cannot apply to residents outside
the province. I disagree. If the CPA applies it applies in its entirety.'69
The parallel with Castillo is clear. Here Winkler J. was proposing that
Ontario legislation had the power to lengthen limitation periods. Bastarache
J. made clear in his judgment in Castillo that to affect extraprovincial rights
166.
167.
168.
169.

Imperial Tobacco, supra note 8 at para. 36.
Wilson (2000), supra note 59.
Webb, supranote 100 at 10.
Bre-X, supra note 57 at para. 44,
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in such a way was contrary to the territorial bounds of provincial legislative
sovereignty. Once again, Unifund's notion of constitutional inapplicability
should be engaged to prevent the extraterritorial application of a provincial
statute to substantive rights that are more closely connected to another
jurisdiction than they are to Ontario. In sum, both class actions' preclusive
effect and class actions' extension of limitation periods are substantive.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence makes clear that provincial substantive
law must not apply outside provinces' constitutionally mandated territorial
spheres. The national opt-out classes that courts have been certifying over
the past thirteen years have therefore offended the constitutional principles
of extraterritoriality.
Is there a way around this conclusion, so that courts can, in fact,
certify extraprovincial opt-out classes? Craig Jones proposes that there
is. I briefly mentioned at the end of Part IV that Jones acknowledges
class actions' substantive effects. After making this acknowledgement,
he conducts a searching and detailed analysis, with the aim of buttressing
national classes' constitutional status. He begins his proposal with the
major premise of his monograph, which is that the aggregation of claims
allows for greater compensation and maximal deterrence. Under a regime
without class actions, defendants facing similar suits can benefit from
greater economies of scale than can plaintiffs. Legal work completed
for one claim can be used again in defending against a similar one, and
litigation costs per claim are quite low. Defendants therefore have little
interest in settling, and risk-averse plaintiffs will often drop their suits.
Class actions fix this problem. The more claims are aggregated, the lower
Olaintiffs' per capita litigation costs become. Lower plaintiffs' litigation
costs yield higher settlement values, since plaintiffs have increasingly
less to lose in going to trial. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that
national classes are desirable: "the defendants' litigation scale is national,
and therefore so must be the plaintiffs'."' 7 °
That class actions are beneficial to plaintiffs and to society drives
Jones's constitutional solution, which is to pick up on Morguard'semphasis
on "order and fairness" in private international law. 7' To Jones, these
principles call for exceptions to be made in the law. With regard to class
actions' effects on limitation periods, he suggests, for example, that courts
could consider class actions to be exceptions to Tolofson's lex loci delicti
rule. Alternatively, courts could consider limitation periods procedural

170. Jones (2003), supra note 2 at 180.
171. Morguard, supra note 6 at para. 33.
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in class action law suits.'72 A further approach would be to look to the
spirit of Hunt,'73 which Jones sees as being a desire to facilitate efficient
litigation.'7 4 Because extraprovincial limitation periods impede class
action lawsuits, they should be considered constitutionally inapplicable to
cases in which a particular province has taken jurisdiction.
With regard to class actions' preclusive effect on non-resident
plaintiffs, Jones continues down the route of "order and fairness." Because
maximally aggregated claims are beneficial to plaintiffs, binding plaintiffs
is not unjust. This, in turn, should inform the extraterritoriality analysis.'75
Placing too much emphasis on plaintiffs' autonomy by requiring them
to consent explicitly to an action by opting in fact hurts everyone by
diminishing plaintiffs' recovery. 7 6 For Jones this fact is enough. Courts
should recognize the benefits of national aggregation, and certify binding
extraprovincial classes.
Jones's arguments about the benefits of national classes, both in his
discussions of national classes and throughout his book, are perceptive
and strongly reasoned, but his solutions come across as unsatisfying.
They really amount to this: national class actions benefit plaintiffs and
deter future harms. The legal definitions of substantive/procedural and
the constitutional law of extraterritoriality must therefore be manipulated
so as to secure national classes' constitutional status. Jones's proposal
that limitation periods could be considered procedural runs afoul of what
Bastarache J. said in Castillo:
That distinction [viz., the distinction between procedural and substantive]
must be based on something other than what a province says. It should in
my view be based on the actual effects of the law. The effects of limitation
periods were made clear in Tolofson: they cancel the substantive rights of
plaintiffs to bring the suit, and they vest a right in defendants to be free
from suit. This is the reality Alberta cannot ignore.'77
Jones is asking the courts to turn a blind eye to what limitation periods
really do in order to facilitate an advantageous policy. Castillo clarifies
the unavailability of such a route.
Jones's proposals on ignoring the rule of lex loci delicti for tort claims,
and allowing opt-out class actions' preclusive effects in the interests of
"order and fairness" seem equally impermissible. As I have set it out in
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Jones (2003), supra note 2 at 188.
Hunt, supra note 1.
Jones (2003), supra note 2 at 190.
Ibid. at 191.
Ibid. at 196-7.
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this article, the law of extraterritoriality should forbid such proposals.
In Unifund, Binnie J. was not concerned with the justice or injustice of
applying a particular recovery statute to a particular accident-that is, he
was not asking whether such application would lead to a good result for the
parties. He was, instead, concerned with the more general question of the
justice of applying a statute of one province to an accident that occurred
in another. He did pay heed to the principles of "order and fairness,"
but not in the way that Jones proposes. Order in Confederation would be
undermined if provincial law were permitted extraterritorial application.'78
Binnie J. also made clear that any considerations of "order and fairness"
will not loosen the territorial boundaries that the constitution places on the
provinces' legislation:
It would be unwise in this case to embark on a general discussion of
"order and fairness". The question before us is quite specific: Does the
respondent have a statutory cause of action against the appellant given
the constitutional limits on the reach of the Ontario InsuranceAct? 179
Similarly, in Churchill Falls80 and Interprovincial Co-operatives'8' the
focus was not on the wisdom of the laws under discussion. Instead, statutes
were struck down because the constitution mandated it. Each judgment in
those cases-majority and dissent-was concerned with locating the right
involved. Whatever motivations may have been working under the surface
of the judges' reasoning, constitutional considerations of territoriality were
front and centre in the judgments. Jones's approach is entirely different.
He begins with a desired result, and does little other than assert that in the
pursuit of this result the courts should ignore the constitution. The notion
of constitutionally entrenched territorial limits simply makes this kind of
reasoning unavailable. As Bich J.A. wrote in Hocking,
Dans le cas ou l'on serait a priorid'avis qu'un recours collectif national
ou multiprovincial risque de contrevenir au principe de la territorialit6,
les arguments de facilitd, de commodit6 et d'efficacit6 dans la gestion
ou l'6conomie des ressources judiciaires ainsi que le drsir d'6viter des
jugements contradictoires ou de limiter les cas o6 un drfendeur devrait
rdpondre Aplusieurs actions identiques dans diverses provinces peuventils justifier un tel recours? Je n'en suis pas certaine, la nature de notre
organisation frd~rale imposant des contraintes dont les effets peuvent
178. Unifund, supra note 8 at para. 71. Binnie J.'s statement on the requirements of order and fairness
was, in this case, specifically referring to the disorder that would result from the application of many
provinces' laws to one car crash, but it seems fair to generalize as I have done.
179. Ibid. at para 81.
180. Churchill Falls, supra note 20.
181. Interprovincial Co-operatives, supra note 91.
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peut-tre dtre mitigds par les r6gles relatives aux conflits de lois, mais qui
ne peuvent pas 8tre ignords. 8 '
This paper will therefore conclude by sketching in broad strokes how
the provincial and federal legislatures should proceed, given that opt-out
national class actions are ultra vires the provinces.
Conclusion: A way forward
Although I reject Jones's suggested constitutional solutions, I do accept
his endorsement of national classes. They conduce to optimal levels
of deterrence and plaintiff recovery. I also accept that defendants need
certainty in class action litigation-certainty provided by class actions'
preclusive effect. Defendants must know how many future claims they
may face before settling.'83 I would consequently not endorse the adoption
of opt-in national class legislation, even though I have suggested above
that such legislation would probably not violate s. 92 of the constitution.'84
As Cassels and Jones point out, opt-in class actions will almost invariably
create smaller classes. This means that litigation costs are not maximally
dispersed among all plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs who do form part of
the action will willingly settle for less than they would if the class were
larger. Quite simply, suing costs more, so settling for less makes sense. 5'
Furthermore, because national opt-in classes would not have preclusive
effect on extraprovincial claims, national opt-in classes would likely be
brought in several jurisdictions. This would remove the certainty that
induces defendants to settle class actions, while at the same time wasting
plaintiffs' resources by requiring duplicative steps in litigation and
duplicative national notice. 186
Instead, I would suggest that provincial legislatures should modify
existing provincial legislation to eliminate all reference to national
classes. Of course, legislation that makes no such references-viz., that
of Ontario, Qu6bec and Nova Scotia-would simply be read to respect the
extraterritorial limits the constitution imposes on provincial legislation.
Because I have interpreted the limitation period and claim-preclusive
sections of class action legislation as substantive law, subject to a division
of powers analysis, these sections in provincial legislation will apply
only to matters within their respective provinces' legislative competence.

182. Hocking, supra note 5 at para. 162.
183. See Rachael Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative
Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) at 37 and Branch & Rhone, supra note 2 at 8.
184. ConstitutionAct, 1867, supranote 16.
185. Cassels & Jones, supranote 2 at 443.
186. Jones (2003), supra note 2.
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There is another consequence to these provisions' being substantive:
they will have no effect on substantive rights under federal competence.
Naturally, Parliament alone has jurisdiction over such rights. Parliament
can, and does, pass limitation legislation with regard to matters under its
constitutional jurisdiction,' 87 and would have the right to pass legislation
mandating the suspension of limitation periods and the preclusive effect
of class actions brought in respect of federal law. This legislation would
refer only to these substantive matters, since, as I have argued above, the
procedural aspects of class action legislation are intra vires the provinces
under s. 92(14). 188 All of these changes would have the effect of putting an
end to national classes, save for the case of classes brought on the basis of a
federal substantive claim. Assuming we accept the jurisdictional solutions
offered in Nantais,8 9 Bre-X' 90 or Harrington,'91 federal claims could have
192
preclusive effect on a national scale, since s. 91 of the constitution
would place no territorial limits on the federal preclusion and limitations
provisions. For the majority of claims, though, the following solution
would be the best permissible approximation of national class actions.
Claims dealing with provincial rights should proceed nationally by
means of parallel provincial opt-out classes. Under this approach, the
substantive effects of provincial class action legislation would manifest
themselves only within their respective provinces' jurisdiction. This is,
essentially, how the plaintiffs in the Canadian Red Cross tainted blood
scandal conducted their litigation. 93 Three class actions began at the same
time: one in Ontario, one in Qudbec and one in British Columbia. The
Ontario class was multijurisdictional, which, of course, differs from my
proposed approach. Counsel in the three actions coordinated closely, and
the parties reached a pan-Canadian settlement amounting to a sum above
$I billion.194 The settlement depended on approval from all three courts, so
as to provide certainty to the Red Cross and the governmental defendants.
All three courts approved.
A similar approach was recently taken by a team of lawyers in a
continent-wide class action concerning tainted pet food. Each province
187. See, e.g., the Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6, s. 14.
188. ConstitutionAct, 1867, supra note 16.
189. Nantais, supra note 69.
190. Bre-X, supra note 57.
191. Harrington,supra note 95.
192. ConstitutionAct. 1867, supra note 16.
193. Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society (1999), 68 B.C.L.R. (3d) 350 (S.C.); Honhon c. Canada
(Procureurgin&al), [ 1999] J.Q. no 4370 (C.S.) (QL); Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Society, [ 1999]
O.J. No. 3572 (Sup. Ct. J.) (QL) [Parsons].
194. Parsons,ibid.at para. 32.
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save for Prince Edward Island had its own class, with Ward Branch in
British Columbia acting as lead Canadian counsel. Nine provincial
superior court judges held parallel settlement hearings, linked by closedcircuit video.' 95 The British Columbian counsel made all submissions
and answered questions from all nine judges. The work of the lawyers in
each province was minor, and appeared mostly to involve receiving draft
orders from the British Columbian counsel's office and reworking them
to accord with each local forum's requirements. The settlement required
unanimous approval to be effective. Approval was delayed by some of
the judges' minor objections to the restrictions that the draft order placed
on the court to modify the settlement in future orders, but the settlement
was soon after approved. The process, however, worked quite smoothly
and approximated the benefits of national classes quite closely-within
constitutional bounds.
In discussing settlements such as this, Cassels and Jones make the
case that plaintiffs lose out:
In province-by-province certification, per-claim litigation costs will
increase for plaintiffs at a greater rate than defendants, settlement
incentives for defendants will decrease below the optimal, compensation
96
per claim will decrease, and fewer valid claims will ever be brought.1j
Whereas defendants "can employ the same experts, use the same legal
research and even employ the same lawyers in each jurisdiction where the
issues are common,"' 9 7 plaintiffs in each jurisdiction will have to pay for
these services redundantly. The Uniform Law Conference of Canada has
similar things to say about parallel provincial actions' effect on plaintiffs'
98
economies of scale. 1
There are two ways in which to answer these claims. The first
is to reiterate the central point of this article, which is that the national
class option is simply not constitutionally available in Canada. National
classes' superiority is therefore irrelevant. The second is to point out that
in litigation such as that in the tainted blood scandal and in the pet food
litigation, the provincial groups were not acting independently, but rather
in a coordinated effort. Under such an arrangement, sharing legal work,
195. The settlement hearing was held in all provincial superior courts, save for that of Prince Edward
Island, November 3, 2008. The author attended the Nova Scotia hearing, presided over by Coughlan J.
The settlement itself can be found in Des Cdteaux c. Menu Foods Grenpar Ltd., 2008 QCCS 6561.
196. Cassels & Jones, supra note 2 at 435-436. For proposals for coordinating national classes that
take for granted the constitutionality of such classes, see Dafoe, supra note 2 and Walker (2008), supra
note 2.
197. Cassels & Jones, supra note 2 at 735.
198. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, supra note 2 at 7.
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research and expert reports under the coordination of lead counsel would
be nearly as easy as it would be for the lawyers of the defendant. Under
the proposed scheme, then, defendants and plaintiffs would suffer from
similar decreases in efficiency of litigation, and settlement values should
not be depressed.
The close coordination of plaintiffs' provincial counsel would also
answer Cassels and Jones's other main objection to parallel provincial
classes, which is the problem of "free riding." The authors explain:
Factual information gained through discovery or trial, legal research, and
arguments all represent expensive investments by plaintiff's counsel,
and each may be obtained for only token cost by a "free rider" who
wishes to exploit the investor's work product, provided that the case
proceeds to hearing or trial. If [a class action] was certified in Ontario,
a class counsel could file in British Columbia. Once certified there, the
British Columbia counsel could do no work, expecting that the Ontario
counsel would be willing to share all its work product in exchange for
any fraction of the fee.' 99
Once we accept that counsel in each province will work closely and
share litigation costs equally, the strength of this argument diminishes,
since costs to each provincial class will be fairly low and the incentives
to "free ride" would simply not be there: participation would be cheap.
Furthermore, Cassels and Jones are forced to make two assumptions in
their argument. The first is that the legal work has been done, and the expert
reports completed. This requires that the first class action has proceeded to
trial, which, in practice, is exceedingly rare.200 It also requires that the first
class's counsel be willing to part with his or her work for a low fee. Free
riding would have the effect of forcing the entirety of the litigation costs
on earlier classes. This would depress the amount of these earlier classes'
eventual recovery after paying litigation costs. In all likelihood it would
also negatively affect counsel's contingency fees. It seems doubtful, then,
that class action practitioners would willingly contribute to this trend by
giving up their work to free-riding colleagues.
As a final point, it seems doubtful that courts would encounter the
problem of lawyers unwilling to participate in a co-operative national
scheme, given that such schemes keep costs down and raise settlement
values by comparison with uncoordinated provincial classes. However, if
ever a court encountered an uncoordinated provincial class competing with
a nationally coordinated one, it could easily stay the former proceeding
199. Cassels & Jones, supra note 2 at 436, note 12.
200. See generally Nagareda, supra note 66.
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under existing legislation. Section 13 of the Ontario Act, for example,
reads as follows:
13 The court, on its own initiative, or on the motion of the party or class
member, may stay any proceeding related to the class proceeding before
it, on such terms as it considers appropriate.20
Under such provisions, which exist in all provincial class action legislation,
courts could give preference to coordinated actions, which, because of their
obvious benefits, would almost invariably exist. Indeed, this is exactly
what occurred in the pet food litigation, where the national consortium
20 2
was granted carriage in disputed carriage motions in British Columbia,
Ontario 2°3 and Qurbec. 20 4 Such provisions would also -give courts the
ability to consolidate parallel classes within the province, where each of
them seeks to join the same coordinated national action.
My proposal, then, is simple. The provinces and the federal government
should restrict or enact substantive class action legislation. Such legislative
action would allow class actions based on federal claims to remain national
in scope, subject, of course, to the law on adjudicative jurisdiction. Because
federal substantive law applies nationally, so might the substantive effects
of class actions based on federal substantive claims. National classes,
however, are constitutionally unavailable to provincial legislatures. Class
actions based on provincial claims will therefore be limited to provinces'
territorial bounds. This is an unfortunate consequence, since it renders the
benefits of full aggregation unavailable to national groups of plaintiffs.
The best solution is parallel provincial classes, each proceeding under
their respective provincial statutes and coordinated nationally. This would
come close to giving plaintiffs maximal economies of scale, while ensuring
that defendants can settle claims definitively.
This paper has suggested that a major issue, often overlooked, is
the extraterritorial effect that provincially enabled class actions have
on substantive rights. Class action legislation precludes the claims -of
extraprovincial parties who have taken no steps to join litigation. In many
cases, these parties do not even realize that they are parties to an action at
all. The preclusion of their claims, therefore, derives from extraterritorial

201. Ontario Class ProceedingsAct, supra note 65, s. 13.
202. Joel v. Menu Foods GenparLtd., 2007 BCSC 1482.
203. Whiting v. Menu Foods Operating Limited Partnership,[2007] O.J. No. 3996 (Sup. Ct. J.)
(QL).
204. Sirois c. Menu Foods Income Fund, 2007 QCCS 5808. For a summary of these disputed
carriage motions, see Ward Branch's blog, "Class Actions in Canada," available online: <http://
classactionsincanada.blogspot.com>.
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substantive legislation. I have shown why this is impermissible under
Canada's constitutional arrangements. This result may be an unfortunate one
for plaintiffs' prospects of recovery, but I have concluded with a suggestion
of coordinated provincial classes, which class counsel has already adopted
in some cases, and which should come close to approximating the benefits
of the national class.

